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1 Introduction
Since the early 2000s when players outside the traditional music ecosystem
started to commercialise new forms of digital distribution, the consumption
of creative content has rapidly shifted over to Internet-based services. In re-
sponse to consumers’ craving for modern and more convenient forms of con-
suming entertainment – all enabled by faster Internet connections – digital
service providers like Spotify, YouTube or Soundcloud have made interactive
on-demand streaming the main form of music consumption via the Internet.1
In Denmark, a recent assessment showed that streaming accounted for as much
as 58.5 % of all revenues from recorded music, and in Norway the figure was 77
%.2
Concurrently, the traditional picture of national exploitation of copyright
has changed. The licensing of novel uses of copyright-protected materials from
rightholders and their organisations has been described anything but smooth.
It appears that traditional licensing mechanisms and arrangements have not
always been able to facilitate right-clearance in the changed environment. In
the previous chapter, various aspects of the collective management of copyright
were examined, including the traditional rationale of reducing transaction costs
∗sebastian.felix.schwemer@jur.ku.dk.
1YouTube was founded in 2005; Spotify dates back to 2006; Deezer, Grooveshark and
Soundcloud launched in 2007. In 2012, the European Commission counted more than 300
music streaming services available in the EU.




of collective management organisations (CMOs).3 In the digital world, some of
these economic rationales for collective administration have been questioned.4
New licensing arrangement and entities have emerged: sometimes influenced
or accompanied by regulatory action and sometimes not. In the EU, restrictions
that prevent multi-territorial licensing (which means the licensing of music that
covers more than one jurisdictional territory at a time) are a focal point for
policymakers and scholars.5 The European legislator has been observing the
area for at least twenty years.6 In this period, various institutional actors (such
as different Directorate Generals within the European Commission) have taken
action. Recently, the facilitation of licenses even spearheaded the EU Commis-
sion’s Digital Agenda as ’Action 1’ where the cross-border licensing dimension
attracted the legislator’s special attention and culminated in the adoption of
Directive 2014/26/EU on collective management of copyright and related rights
and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online use in the
internal market (hereinafter ”CRM Directive”).7
According to the user generated law framework, ”law that accommodates the
needs of the knowledge society” is characterized by (1) flexible norms (2) with
cross-border scope and (3) which are industry- and subject-specific. This chap-
ter revisits the developments in the field with regards to licensing arrangements
and tests whether the user generated law methodology can construe the emerg-
ing legal regulatory (based on contracts and laws) and non-regulatory models
(based on technology and social norms). The history of these cross-border li-
censing models can to a large extent be seen as interplay between regulatory
3A collecting society (now commonly referred to as a ’collective management organisation’
within the EU) is defined in Article 3 lit (a) Directive 2014/26/EU as an organisation which
”is authorised by law or by way of assignment, license or any other contractual arrangement
to manage copyright or rights related to copyright on behalf of more than one rightholder,
for the collective benefit of those rightholders, as its sole or main purpose, and which fulfils
one or both of the following criteria: (i) it is owned or controlled by its members; (ii) it is
organised on a not-for-profit basis.” Given the different shades between the national CMOs,
the Directive does not refer to the level of solidarity or regulation as characteristics.
4See e.g. Josef Drexl, ’Competition in the field of collective management: preferring "cre-
ative competition" to allocative efficiency in European copyright law’ in Paul Torremans (ed),
Copyright Law, Handbook of Contemporary Research (Edward Elgar 2007), 261 or Ariel Katz,
’The Potential Demise of Another Natural Monopoly: New Technologies and the Administra-
tion of Performance Rights’ (2006) 2(2) Journal of Competition Law and Economics.
5Lucie Guilbault,’The Draft Collective Management Directive’ in Irini Stamatoudi and
Paul Torremans (eds), EU Copyright Law, A commentary (Edward Elgar 2014), 698. e.g.
notes that a significant portion of royalties derives from non-domestic repertoire, which makes
the facilitation of multi-territorial licenses an important issue. The increasing demand for
cross-border access and licensing solutions for different content types has also been one topic
of the EU Commission’s Copyright Consultation in 2014.
6See e.g. European Commission, Green Paper, Copyright and Related Rights in the Infor-
mation Society (19.07.1995), COM(95), 382 final, 71.
7Directive 2014/26/EU consists of two major parts: the first part establishes a governance
and transparency framework for all collective management organisations. The second part
establishes a set of rules specifically for multi-territorial licensing of music for online use by
author CMOs.
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activity and private mechanisms. This is also the area of interplay that this
chapter will focus upon.
First, the chapter examines the emergence of cross-border licensing models
for online use, revisiting the distinct phases of model contracts, multi-territorial
mono-repertoire licensing entities, licensing hubs, and the most recent forms
of licensing and related regulatory activities. In its second part, the chap-
ter analyses how well these developments accord with the user generated law
methodology. Does the example of online licensing pass all phases of the the-
oretical model? Why have the licensing arrangements been created in the first
place? Do determinants from the methodological model have an influence on
the emergence of the specific user generated law? The chapter concludes with
some broader observations on the applicability of the user generated law model.
2 Emerging licensing models – stocktaking and outlook
2.1 Model contracts as user generated law – competition concerns
and soft law
Traditionally, mass uses of copyright protected works have been confined to the
territory of specific countries. Rightholders (i.e. authors, composers, publish-
ers, performers, and record labels for secondary uses) assign the administration
of their rights to the respective national collective management organisation
(CMO).8 In order to offer licenses for a wider repertoire covering global (non-
domestic) repertoire, CMOs have entered into a complex network of so-called
reciprocal representation agreements (RRAs) with each other.9 Hereby, along
with its own national repertoire, a CMO obtains the right to license the reper-
toire of the CMOs with which it has a bilateral arrangement. As such, the
traditional arrangement has revolved around national monopoly one-stop-shops
which have licensed the entire world music repertoire for use in their respective
domestic territories.10
Back in the 1970s, the European Commission did not have concerns regard-
ing CMOs’ practices ”of restricting their activities to delimitated administration
8See e.g. A. Capobianco, ’Licencing of Music Rights: Media Convergence, Technological
Developments and EC Competition Law’ (2004) E.I.P.R. 113, 114. Thomas Riis, ’Collecting
societies, competition, and the Services Directive’ (2011) 6 Journal of Intellectual Property
Law & Practice 482-493. Violaine Dahin, ’The future of legal online music services in the
European Union: a review of the EU Commission’s recent initiatives in cross-border copyright
management’ (2010) 32(5) E.I.P.R. 223 or Tilman Lüder, ’The First Experience with EU-wide
Online Music Licensing’ (2007) GRUR Int. 649-658.
9This remains the norm. See e.g. recital 40 Directive 2014/26/EU. Also: Dahin, 223
and Lucie Guilbault & Stef van Gompel, ’Collective Management in the European Union’ in
Daniel Gervais (ed), Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights (Kluwer Law
International 2010) 135.
10Peter Gyertyánfy, ’Collective Management of Music Rights in Europe After the CISAC
Decision’ (2010) IIC, 60.
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territories and of concluding representation agreements”11 to national one-stop-
shop. In the early 2000s, the CMOs’ umbrella organisations developed two
standard agreements which amended pre-existing agreements.12 The model
contracts aimed at enabling licensees to obtain a license for online exploitation
of the worldwide repertoire from their national CMO. This time, however, soon
after the two standard agreements were reached, the Directorate General Com-
petition of the European Commission expressed competition concerns regarding
a customer allocation clause contained in both agreements – despite its support
for the underlying one-stop shop principle.13 The agreements have not been
renewed and concluded respectively. In proceedings related to the Online Mu-
sic Recommendation (see below), stakeholders pointed towards the difficulty of
reconciling the digital ubiquitous nature of the Internet with traditional RRAs
which did not foresee that CMOs grant licenses beyond their home territory.14
The CISAC proceedings dealt with model law and the systematic delineation
of territory, too.15 In reviewing a process which dated back to a complaint in
2000, the Directorate Competition assessed RRAs between 24 European author-
CMOs based on a CISAC model contract.16 In its decision from 2008, the Com-
mission took the standpoint that a series of aspects, including membership and
territorial restrictions incorporated in the RRAs concluded between the CMOs,
constituted infringements of competition rules, Article 101 TFEU.17 The defen-
dant CMOs were obliged to strictly bilaterally renegotiate their representation
agreements.18 Almost all CMOs appealed the decision, and in 2013 the General
Court partially annulled the DG COMP’s decision, yet only in respect of the
question of whether the CMOs had engaged in concerted action – not in respect
of membership and exclusivity clauses.19
11Gyertyánfy, 69 pointing towards the first GEMA decision of 2 June 1971.
12These were: the Santiago Agreement covering the rights of online public performance
(by the author societies’ umbrella organisation CISAC); and the Barcelona Agreement cover-
ing digital reproduction (issued by the mechanical collecting societies’ umbrella organisation
BIEM).
13European Commission, Notification of cooperation agreements (Case COMP/C-2/38.377
– BIEM Barcelona Agreements), (2002/C 132/10) and European Commission, Notice
published pursuant to Article 27(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 in Cases
COMP/ C2/39152 – BUMA and COMP/C2/39151 SABAM (Santiago Agreement –
COMP/C2/38126), (2005/C 200/05). See European Commission, Press Release IP/04/586 of
May 3, 2004.
14Lüder (2007), 655.
15For a comprehensive overview on CJEU case law on representation agreements prior to
2008, see Gyertyánfy 67f.
16In 2000, RTL filed a complaint against the German CMO GEMA because it had requested
a pan-European multi-repertoire license which had been rejected by GEMA on the grounds
that it only held multi-repertoire for Germany. In 2003, Music Choice Europe filed a complaint
against the umbrella organisation CISAC, claiming that the model standard contract was a
concerted practice to avoid competition between CMOs.
17Cf. European Commission, CISAC decision, recital 14, 9.
18See Gyertyánfy (2010), 73.
19Case T-442/08 CISAC v European Commission.
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Beyond its assessments concerning competition law, the European Com-
mission has also sought to scrutinise multi-territorial licensing from a Single
Market perspective. In 2004, having observed the collective management of
copyright for several years, a Communication was issued stating that ”more
common ground on several features of collective management is required” in
order to achieve the Single Market.20 The Commission opted for a soft-law
instrument, and in May 2005 published its Recommendation 2005/737/EC on
collective cross-border management of copyright and related rights for legiti-
mate online music services. Aiming to introduce competition both up- and
downstream21, it advocated the introduction of multi-territorial licenses and
stipulated that rightholders should have the right to assign the management of
their online rights necessary to operate online music services to a CMO of their
choice, irrespective of the residence or the nationality of either the CMO or the
rightholder (Article 3).22
As Drexl (2007) notes, in utilising this model the Recommendation opted
for a ”totally new system of direct licensing without relying on reciprocal rep-
resentation agreements”23 instead of recommending a system similar to the
IFPI/Simulcasting model for RRAs.24 Academics and various stakeholders have
criticized the Commission’s approach and the consequences it had regarding the
licensing practice.25
2.2 Emergence of multi-territorial mono repertoire direct licensing
At the beginning of 2006, the licensing landscape began to change fundamentally
when a major music publisher withdrew its mechanical rights for the online use
20Cf. European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the
European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, The Management
of Copyright and Related Rights in the Internal Market (16.04.2004), COM(2004) 261 final,
19.
21See Lüder, 656.
22See also Sebastian Felix Schwemer, ’The licensing of online music streaming services in
Europe’ in Richard Watt (ed), Handbook of the Economics of Copyright, A guide for Students
and Teachers (Edward Elgar 2014), 152.
23Josef Drexl, ’Competition in the field of collective management: preferring ”creative com-
petition” to allocative efficiency in European copyright law’ in Paul Torremans (ed), Copyright
Law, Handbook of Contemporary Research (Edward Elgar 2007) 280.
24The situation for simulcasting or webcasting (i.e. non-interactive broadcasting of musi-
cal works via the Internet) is somewhat special and outside the scope of this chapter. It is,
however, noteworthy that the fear of competition by means of price dumping was not shared.
RRAs regarding the licensing of the related rights of phonogram producers did not contain
an economic residence clause thus enabling competition between CMOs; the European Com-
mission thus granted an antitrust exemption (European Commission, Decision of 8 October
2002 relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA
Agreement (Case No COMP/C2/38.14 – IFPI ”Simulcasting”), 2003/300/EC).
25For instance, Drexl (2007) argues that the Recommendation focuses on output and price
in terms of a static competition model ”without taking into account the purpose of copyright
to promote creativity and cultural diversity”.
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of its Anglo-American repertoire from the respective national CMOs.26 Instead,
it enshrined its rights in customized licensing entities that use a direct license
model for a single repertoire on a multi-territorial basis.27
The other major publishers and several independent publishers followed suit
with similar models which appointed their rights to new licensing entities or
CMOs as exclusive or non-exclusive agents. Interestingly, the newly formed en-
tities were in several instances formed as subsidiaries of major European CMOs.
This process may have been negotiated at the expense of smaller CMOs, as
Guilbault and van Gompel (2010) point out.28 Most importantly, these devel-
opments meant a further fragmentation of repertoire.29 As a result, national
CMOs could no longer grant licenses for the entire global repertoire. Instead,
a licensee was required to obtain licenses both from the national CMO and via
the mono-repertoire licensing arrangements.30
Yet the phenomenon of multi-territorial licensing remains inextricably inter-
twined with mono-territorial licensing (i.e. licensing for only one country).31
Musical works often have several authors and may be published by more than
one publisher.32 These split copyrights mean that it is sometimes not sufficient
to clear rights with only one rightholder in order to cover a single song (see
also recital 37 of Directive 2014/26/EU). Ultimately, from the online service
providers’ and consumers’ perspective, the aggregation of a global repertoire is
the major concern, as the European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs
points out.33 The fragmentation of rights, rightholders and repertoires is at the
core of high transaction costs34 – which collectivization of rights management
26CELAS (Central European Licensing and Administration Services) was a licensing agency
jointly owned by the German and British CMOs GEMA and PRS for Music. CELAS pro-
vided a one-stop shop for the repertoire of EMI Music Publishing for online exploitation. In
2014, Sony/ATV Music Publishing, PRS for Music and GEMA launched a new joint ven-
ture called SOLAR – a one-stop shop for the Sony/ATV and EMI music publishing licensing
catalogue (see press release at: http://www.celas.eu/CelasTabs/Content/solarlaunch.pdf,
September 2014). This followed the acquisition of EMI Music Publishing by Sony in 2012.
SOLAR replaced the CELAS and PAECOL licensing systems. For a more detailed overview,
see Schwemer, 153-155.
27Giuseppe Mazziotti, ’New Licensing Models for Online Music Services in the European
Union: From Collective to Customized Management’ (2011) Columbia Public Law Research
Paper No. 11-269, uses the term ”customized” collective rights management. Dehin (2010),
228 refers to it as the ”new rights managers model”.
28Cf. Guilbault and van Gompel (2010), 161.
29See e.g. Riis (2011), p. 482.
30In 2012, the European Commission estimated that approximately 30 licenses are needed
in order to clear author rights for a pan-European service.
31See also Schwemer (2014).
32Gyertyánfy (2010), 65.
33Guilbault (2014), 770, citing European Parliament, Committee on Legal Affairs, Working
Document on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights
in musical works for online uses in the internal market (COM(2012)0372 – C7-9183/2012 –
2012/0180(COD)) 4 March 2013.
34KEA Affairs (2012), Licensing music works and transaction costs in Europe, 51.
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originally aimed to reduce.
The development of these novel direct licensing arrangements must be seen
in the context of the two actions taken by the EU Commission which sought to
foster multi-territorial licensing of music rights for the Internet: the CISAC pro-
ceedings and Recommendation 2005/737/EC. The European legislator reflects
in recital 39 of Directive 2014/26/EU that the Recommendation has not been
sufficient to encourage the widespread multi-territorial licensing or to address
the specific demands.35
Guibault (2014) concludes that the
”majority of scholarly commentators, policy makers and stakeholders
agree that the intention behind the Recommendation of fostering
competition between individual collective management organisations
has created chaos rather than anything else.”36
It is interesting to note that the European legislator has chosen not to apply
the rules of the CRM Directive to mono-repertoire licensing entities. Since such
entities represent only a single rightholder, they fall outside the scope of the
definitions of Article 3 lit (m) Directive 2014/26/EU.
2.3 Licensing hubs formed by author CMOs
More recently, new influences have appeared in the online music licensing ecosys-
tem: several collective management organisations have joined forces and formed
so-called ’licensing hubs’ with the aim of providing a one-stop solution for ac-
quiring licenses for online use of music.
These licensing hubs differ from the mono-repertoire multi-territorial direct
licensing entities (see section above) in terms of the repertoire they license:
a licensee can acquire a multi-territorial license for the joint repertoire of all
the CMOs taking part in the respective hub model (multi-territorial, multi-
repertoire).
The emergence of these hubs began as early as 2007, when the Spanish,
French and Italian author-CMOs (SGAE, SACEM and SIAE respectively) an-
nounced their joint one-stop shop licensing platform Armonia. While officially
formed as European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG) in 2013, this hub ac-
tually licensed its first deal in November 2012.37 Several other CMOs joined
35While a Recommendation is a soft-law tool, it is taken into account by the CJEU when
interpreting the acquis communitaire.
36Guilbault (2014), 763. Gyertyanfy (2010), 85, for example, states that the ”Commission
successfully demolished an essential element of collective management – in exchange for very
few competition law advantages”.
37For more see: Schwemer (2014), 159.
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the hub, which currently covers repertoires of SACEM (France and Luxem-
bourg), SGAE (Spain), SIAE (Italy), SPA (Portugal), SABAM (Belgium), Ar-
tisjus (Hungary), SUISA (Switzerland) and a bulk of Anglo-American and Latin-
American works.38 The German, Swedish and British societies GEMA, STIM
and PRS for Music have announced a similar initiative, which has recently been
approved by the European Commission in an investigation under the EU Merger
Regulation.39 Since 2009, the Nordic and Baltic states have had a cooperation
model in place which allows users to obtain a license covering mechanical re-
production and performance rights for online exploitations from a single source
for the respective territories. In this setup, Nordisk Copyright Bureau (NCB),
which is owned by the Nordic author-CMOs, acts as a single entry point for the
licensee but does not hold the respective rights.
This trend towards licensing hubs of CMOs can partially be seen in the
context of the licensing regime that Directive 2014/26/EU proposes with the
aim of facilitating the re-aggregation of rights for online use. In the preparatory
work for the Directive, the European legislator opted for a model referred to
as ’European Licensing Passport’. While the notion of a passport-model was
dropped in the final Directive, the legislator kept the basic idea, now enshrined
in Articles 24 and 30 of Directive 2014/26/EU. Entities, which must fulfil certain
minimum requirements, are expected to aggregate repertoire for multi-territory
licensing. Local uses, on the other hand, would still be licensed by the national
collective management organisation. As I have pointed out earlier, the European
Commission expects that by encouraging the voluntary aggregation of music
repertoire, the number of licenses a user needs to obtain in order operate a
multi-territorial service shall be reduced.40
Thus, the legislator has further narrowed the autonomy space in which
CMOs operate. The CRMDirective must be implemented by the Member States
by 10 April 2016. The re-aggregation is mainly based on voluntary actions by
CMOs and it is still too early to predict whether the licensing hub-model will
be more broadly used and lead to the predicted market consolidation.
2.4 Towards new players and (even more) direct licensing?
As noted, the market for online licensing is under transition. There have been
several recent controversies, where rightholders either have chosen not to license
their content catalogue for online exploitation by music streaming services or
38See Armonia press release, available at: http://www.armoniaonline.eu/release/
SUISAjoinsEN.pdf.
39See European Commission, Press release IP/15/5204 (16 June 2015) in Case M.6800 –
PRSfM/STIM/GEMA/JV.
40See European Commission, Impact Assessment 2012, 163. Recital 24 of the proposed
Directive. Schwemer, 157.
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pulled their catalogue. Besides the question of whether streaming constitutes
a substitute for other forms of consumptions,41 royalty rates have been a key
concern. Rightholders have expressed their discontent with the negotiations led
by the CMOs to which they have transferred their rights for exploitation. In a
context characterised by increased transparency and technical means (namely
backend software and reporting standards) academics, rightholders and users
pose the question as to whether the traditional setup of collective management
organisations is the most efficient means of licensing content.42
In the US, a new player called Global Music Rights (GMR)43 is aiming
to take on music publishing incumbents for performance rights. Through di-
rect licensing of selected popular songwriters, the licensor aims to negotiate
higher royalties than the counterparts BMI and ASCAP. This leverage exists,
for example, because GMR can refuse permissions regarding its songs, while
the incumbents are highly regulated and need to offer blanket licenses.44 While
this specific example has to be seen in the context of the US ecosystem, it
seems reasonable to consider whether similar developments would be possible
in Europe.
The CRMDirective opens up for direct licensing in respect to multi-territorial
licensing under certain conditions in order to prevent a national repertoire lock-
in. Article 31 of Directive 2014/26/EU regulates that rightholders can withdraw
their online rights in musical works from traditional CMOs so as to grant multi-
territorial licenses for their online rights in musical works themselves or through
any other party they authorise or through any collective management organisa-
tion complying with the provisions of the Directive. Rightholders do not have
to withdraw those rights from their CMO for the purpose of mono-territorial
licensing. Guibault (2014) notes the critique expressed by the CMO umbrella
organisation GESAC which argues that the direct licensing possibility in Article
31 contradicts the principle of exclusivity in the assignments of rights in favour
of the initial CMO.45
In Article 3 lit (b) the legislator also introduced the new notion of ’indepen-
dent management entities’.46 The main difference between collective manage-
41For an economic analysis see: Godefroy Dang Nguyen, Sylvain Dejean & François Moreau,
’Are streaming and other music consumption modes substitutes or complements?’ (2012)
available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2025071.
42For a discussion of the traditional rationales for collective management in the digital era,
see Katz (2006).
43More information at: http://globalmusicrights.com.
44See: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/30/business/media/
new-venture-seeks-higher-royalties-for-songwriters.html.
45Guilbault (2014), 775 with more references.
46Art. 3 lit (b) it defines ’independent management entity’ as any organisation ”which is
authorised by law or by way of assignment, license or any other contractual arrangement to
manage copyright or rights related to copyright on behalf of more than one rightholder, for
the collective benefit of those rightholders, as its sole or main purpose, and which is: (i)
9
ment organisations and an independent management entity lies in the ownership
or control structure; the latter is neither owned nor controlled by rightholders
and is organised on a for-profit basis. So far, there is some ambiguity as to
what such entities are and it remains a matter of speculation as to whether the
European legislator had such developments in mind.47
It remains to be seen how Member States will choose to implement the
definition and the rule in Article 31, which is directed towards situations where
a CMO does not grant or offer to grant multi-territorial licenses or does not
allow another CMO to represent those rights for such purpose by 10 April 2017.
2.5 The operational picture
In the context of cross-border licensing, the user generated law framework may
need to consider the relevance not only of initial licensing and renegotiation
but also the operations of such services. Many challenges in relation to on-
line music are not directly related to licensing but reside in the operational
processes such as documentation and reporting from service providers about
played tracks and the payment of royalties from the respective organisations to
their rightholders.48 There have been several initiatives to tackle some of these
operational challenges. The Global Repertoire Database, for example, was an
industry initiative started in 2008 with the goal of creating a joint database cov-
ering ownership and control of musical works. The Swedish CMO has started a
supplier for business process outsourcing services, International Copyright En-
terprise (ICE). In 2012, Network of Music Partners (NMP) was founded and
it centres its activities on the administrative processes of invoicing for use of
music and distributing royalties. NMP is jointly owned by NCB and PRS for
Music. NMP handles the administrative back-office inter alia for the Nordic-
Baltic online markets and the pan-European central licensing of the EMI cat-
alogues. Front-office activities such as licensing and member services remain
with the parent companies (NCB and PRS for Music). The services by NMP
and ICE are also used by other European CMOs, for example the Dutch society
neither owned nor controlled, directly or indirectly, wholly or in part by rightholders; and (ii)
organised on a for-profit basis”. In recital 15 to Directive 2014/26/EU, those are described
as commercial entities inter alia because they are not owned or controlled by rightholders.
However, to the extent such independent management entities carry out the same activities
as collective management organisations, they should be obliged to provide certain information
to the rightholders they represent, collective management organisations, users and the public.
47Given the reference to ’collective benefit’ in the definition of an independent management
entity, the feature that rightholders have no control makes the provision somewhat contra-
dictory. Recital 16 contains a list of what should not be regarded ’independent management
entities’.
48The European Commission, for example, mentions the outsourcing of back-office functions
in the accompanying memo to its proposal for the CRM Directive (MEMO/12/545 at point
15). See also my prior research in Schwemer (2014).
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Buma/Stemra.49 In addition, several standards such as DDEX, CCID or ISNI
have been developed for tasks like reporting and invoicing.
3 The online music-licensing ecosystem as an example of user gen-
erated law
The previous section illustrates that multiple intertwined developments and
arrangements for the licensing of music online have occurred and that they
must be seen in their distinct historical context. This section analyses how well
these developments accord with the user generated law framework. Does the
example of online licensing pass all phases of the theoretical model? Why have
the licensing arrangements been created in the first place? Do all determinants
from the methodological model have an influence on the emergence of the specific
user generated law?
There are multiple entry points to the process of evaluating the legal innova-
tions created by users. Firstly, model contracts (as in the case of the Barcelona
and Santiago Agreements or CISAC terms) could be seen as examples where
users create a layer of private regulation. A second starting point is the emer-
gence of multi-territorial mono-repertoire licensing entities which has happened
since 2006. Thirdly, the more recent development of licensing hubs formed by
CMOs seems worthy of further scrutiny. In addition, other current developments
such as a potential move towards more direct licensing or legal arrangements
outside of licensing (e.g. regarding operations) could be relevantly construed
under the framework. The focus of this chapter will be on the first three exam-
ples.
3.1 Autonomy spaces and interdependencies between the licensing
models
The developments around cross-border licensing models are characterised by
an interplay between private arrangements and regulatory activity. This inter-
action is between self-organisation on one side, and soft-law measures (such as
green papers), and Recommendations, and recent legislative measures, as well as
competition proceedings on the other side. Such interactions are an important
consideration when applying the user generated law framework to these licens-
ing models. This dynamic can partly be understood according to what is termed
autonomy spaces in user generated law methodology. Autonomy spaces refer
to State-enacted law that defines a space within which persons or organisations




Collective management organisations are regulated to a varying degree across
European countries and set up in a range of ways. In some cases, for example,
national organisations are de facto monopolies and in other cases de jure monop-
olies.51 The degree of regulation can also vary: the German CMOs, for instance,
were traditionally highly regulated, while the French CMOs were intermediately
regulated, and the British CMOs lightly regulated.52 Thus, European CMOs
traditionally had different spaces to operate in.
In addition, there might also be a certain interplay between the different
licensing models. Have the Barcelona and Santiago standard agreements served
as inspiration for later models or prepared conditions for them? Is the licens-
ing hub idea implemented in the current multi-territorial licensing models? Or
are all arrangements more or less independent developments, created without
reference to other or earlier models? Given the complexity of the developments
in a field that is not static but constantly developing, it is difficult to obtain
a clear picture; but it is safe to say there have been at least some interdepen-
dencies. While further exploring these questions does not fall within the scope
of this chapter, it is important to acknowledge that the correlations between
the different licensing models can point towards the dissemination criterion of
the user generated law model. If a licensing model has been copied or served
as inspiration for later constructions, the original model has been disseminated
and thus further processed within the model framework.
Figure 1, below, displays a simplified overview of the evolution of the licens-
ing arrangements which have been described in the first part of this chapter. The
traditional landscape consisted of national CMOs, which – via reciprocal rep-
resentation agreements (RRAs) based on model contracts – were able to grant
mono-territorial multi-repertoire licenses. In light of the CISAC decision and
the Recommendation of 2005, new customised licensing entities which license
multi-territorial on a mono-repertoire basis have emerged as additional licen-
sors. Directive 2014/26/EU codifies some of the developments and promotes
inter alia a regime of licensing HUBs in which CMOs join forces to license
on a multi-territorial and multi-repertoire basis, potentially leading to the re-
aggregation of rights. Besides this, the Directive differentiates between CMOs
and so-called independent management entities (IMEs) which are organised on
a for-profit basis and are neither owned nor controlled, directly or indirectly,
50Riis, Chapter 1 of this book.
51In Italy or Austria, for example, CMOs are regulated as legal monopolies. See e.g. G. M.
Riccio, G. Codiglione, Copyright Collecting Societies, Monopolistic Positions and Competi-
tion in the EU Single Market (2014) 7 Masaryk U.J.L.Tech., 287.
52An overview of how CMOs in several countries have been regulated is given by Besen
Kirby, Compensating Creators of Intellectual Property, Collectives That Collect (1989).
12
wholly or in part, by rightholders. It is important to note that the different li-
censing arrangements have not necessarily replaced each other but rather added
additional licensing layers over time.
Figure 1: Evolution of licensing arrangements
3.2 The emergence of cross-border models
The first phase of user generated law is the emergence phase which is deemed
to rely on four determinants: (1) heterogeneous demands for legal solutions,
(2) expectation of benefits, (3) asymmetric information and (4) the existence of
one or more lead users. Can those four determinants construe the emergence of
private regulatory models within this sub-space of intellectual property rights?
3.2.1 Heterogeneous demand
The first determinant for the emergence of user generated law is held to be the
heterogeneous demand for legal solutions. Though not contained in the original
model by Eric von Hippel, the cross-border dimension is proffered as a crucial
element within the user generated law framework.53 The Internet’s borderless
technological nature enables users to access content from all over the world. On-
line licensing is inherently more of a cross-border undertaking than traditional
oﬄine licensing. This is also where the heterogeneity lies. Existing licensing
53Riis, Chapter 1 of this book.
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models, it appears, have not been able to deal with cross-border licensing in the
digital context.
As I have noted in the findings of earlier research:
”music-streaming services usually approach their markets on a terri-
torial and not on a pan-European level. The decision to enter a local
market is influenced by a combination of several elements: one key
consideration constitutes the ability to get the respective rights at a
cost efficient level. A second key consideration concerns the general
economic situation and the general legal context of the respective
local market.”54
3.2.2 Expectation of benefits
Private regulatory models are supposedly only created if users can expect ben-
efits from them (i.e. the models generate value by being used). This condition
is fulfilled if the parties (rightholders and licensees) benefit from the licensing
models. We can differentiate between regulatory models that do not require an
institutional set-up (e.g. pure contractual agreements) and models that do (e.g.
copyright collective management organisations that require an organisation to
collect remuneration).55 The greater the set-up costs involved, the greater the
expected benefits must be in order for a private regulatory model to be de-
ployed. KEA Affairs (2012) identifies in its report on online music licensing
that the fragmentation of rights, rightholders and repertoires is at the core of
high transaction costs in Europe.56 On this issue, the European legislator for-
mulates the aspiration of the CRM Directive to facilitate new online services and
thereby enhance consumer choice and lead to a reduction in transaction costs
which should be passed on to consumers.57 When imposing legislation on the
space, the Commission expresses its expectation that music publishers would
consider ”re-entrusting part of their rights to collecting societies that comply
with passport requirements and fulfil certain conditions of good governance”.58
The mere existence of the multi-territorial licensing arrangements suggests that
either the parties enjoy benefits or that the legislator has forced these models.59
54Schwemer (2014), 150.
55Riis, Chapter 1 of this book.
56KEA Affairs (2012), 51.
57Recital 44 of Directive 2014/26/EU.
58See European Commission, Impact Assessment 2005, 162. CELAS, for example, con-
cluded sub-agency agreements with collecting societies such as KODA (DK), STIM (SE) and
TEOSTO (FI).




Compared to legislating multi-territorial licensing, private arrangements are
argued to be better at addressing the problematic asymmetry of information
possessed by the legislator and the parties affected by the law. The ensuing
argumentation and narrative adheres closely to the discussion in the previous
chapter on ”Collective Agreements for the Clearance of Copyrights – The Case
of Collective Management and Extended Collective Licenses” with minor adjust-
ments. In practice, the legislator will regularly lack the requisite information for
solving the task in an optimal way. A freely organized multi-territorial licens-
ing regime between the different parties will be based on much more adequate
information than a decision made by the legislator. In this way, asymmetric
information is an essential dynamic in the emergence of cross-border licensing
models. In regard to such cross-border licensing, the legislator has partly regu-
lated the field with the CRM Directive. This has implications for the adoption
of the legal innovations and will be discussed in the section devoted to that part
of the model.
3.2.4 The existence of one or more lead users
The existence of individual or multiple lead users is the final element that is
said to foster the formation of user generated law. Initially, it is important
to identify the ’users’ in the CMO/new licensing entities model. Users in user
generated law are not only the persons subjected to but also affected by the
law. A reasonable starting point when identifying ’users’ is to look towards the
relationship between licensors and licensees. In downstream licensing this would
be the relation of collective management organisations to online music service
providers. Here, service providers acquire a license for the respective repertoire
from a CMO. A second horizontal licensing relation can be found between the
CMOs where organisations via reciprocal representation agreements enable each
other to offer licenses for other CMOs’ repertoires in their respective territory.
When looking at the horizontal relation between collective management or-
ganisations, industry umbrella organisations have played a crucial role in devel-
oping model contracts and facilitating best practices. As noted in the previous
section, the organisations CISAC and BIEM have developed several model con-
tracts for their member organisations. While information on the exact devel-
opment of these model contracts is scarce, one can assume that the umbrella
organisations have acted in a fashion that matches the definition of a lead user.
However, one caveat in regard to the model is related to motivation: Schovsbo
(2010) emphasises the importance of acknowledging that CMOs like all other
institutions ”have a vested interest in maintaining a system which is dependent
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on their services.”60
In the downstream relation it is more difficult to draw a clear picture. One
can assume that online music service providers (and possibly rightholders them-
selves) have pushed CMOs to offer the requested licenses.61 Yet there is no clear
evidence available that this would have led to the development of private regu-
lation. Scrutiny of the commercial motivations of those involved suggests that
service providers initially had little interest in multi-territorial licensing models
since they approached markets for commercial reasons on a country-by-country
basis.
In relation to the emergence of direct licensing (i.e. multi-territorial mono-
repertoire licensors like CELAS) the Court argues in the CISAC case that:
”the abandonment of the exclusivity clause made possible certain
developments in the market, namely the grant of the first direct
licenses, which are necessary if an eventual move beyond the national
territorial limitations is to be envisaged”62
The court continues that:
”[t]he spread of direct licensing required, in particular, that a demand
for such licences develop on the part of major users which – instead
of turning to the collecting societies of all the countries in which they
operate – would prefer to acquire direct licences, valid worldwide,
over the repertoires which interest them.”63
The foundation of CELAS was announced in early 2006, making it the first
mover in the field. Anecdotal evidence shows that the major (US American)
repertoire rightholders behind the novel licensing entities and arrangement had
a preference for this setup.64 On the other hand, smaller rightholders such as
those dealing with niche repertoire might not necessarily gain the same benefits
from this setup.65 The large incumbents acted in a fashion described as lead
users within the user generated framework.
When looking at licensing HUBs, the initiating CMOs such as the founding
societies of Armonia have taken a lead user role. In a different field (visual
arts) a comparable one-stop shop by the respective CMOs has been offered by
OnLineArt S.C.R.L since 2002. While the European legislator makes reference
to this model in some of its documents, it is unclear to what extent the solution
60See Schovsbo, Jens, The Necessity to Collectivize Copyright - And Dangers Thereof (June
30, 2010). (Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1632753) 9.
61Cf. also footnote 66.
62Recital 125, CISAC Case T-442/08.
63Recital 127, CISAC Case T-442/08.
64See e.g. Gyeryánfy (2010), 59.
65Compare Lüder (2007), 657.
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for online music licensing has been inspired by this setup. The Nordic-Baltic one-
stop storefront solution offered by NCB also exhibits similarities. In this context,
the CRM Directive appears as codification parallel to the developments of the
market (also discussed below under ’adoption phase’). The Directive has to be
implemented by the Member States by April 2016, so in a way the CMOs are
early in adopting this model; but one could argue that the latest developments
are at least partially imposed by the regulative context. This is also supported
by the fact that in its Recommendation of 2005 the European Commission was
envisioning the pooling of repertoire into a major online licensing platform.66
In summary, it is evident that this process has relied on the engagement
of different lead users with different levels of involvement. CMOs feature as
users, along with the community consisting of rightholders and other relevant
stakeholders in the industry. Yet rightholders themselves have also engaged in
the process in ways which resemble the lead user paradigm.
3.2.5 Diffusion phase
Once new licensing arrangements emerge, communities form around the legal
innovation. This is the second phase of the user generated law framework. The
framework does not offer further refinement of the community definition which
can be understood in both a broad and a narrow sense.
Model contracts developed by umbrella organisations have been used by
CMOs as a basis for their bilateral reciprocal agreements.67 In regard to multi-
territorial mono-repertoire licensing, entities like CELAS, all other major pub-
lishers, and several independent publishers have followed suit and adopted sim-
ilar models. In the case of licensing HUBs, several other collective management
organisations have joined Armonia. Thus, it appears that all of the described
licensing arrangements have formed more or less broad communities around
them.
3.2.6 Adoption phase
In terms of the adoption of legal innovations, the user generated law method-
ology foresees two forms for this which both take their starting point in the
legislator: private regulatory models evolve either as new layers of law based
on State-enacted law or as sui generis legal systems. Again, it is useful to
differentiate between the arrangements as legal innovations: model contracts,
multi-territorial mono-repertoire licensing entities, and licensing hubs.
66On the matter of authors, composers and publishers pooling into one platform, see Lüder
(2007), 656.
67See e.g. Lüder (2007), 654.
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As seen in section 3.1, there is a distinct interplay between private initiatives
and regulatory activity in the sphere of online music licensing. A lack of satis-
factory legal innovation (in this context referring to a solution for cross border
licensing of online music) led the legislator to come up with a non-binding in-
strument, namely the Recommendation of 2005, in order to achieve its policy
goals. Almost one decade later, the legislator has regulated part of the play-
ing field. The CRM Directive aims towards the establishment of hubs for the
licensing of online music by author-CMOs. In this context it is interesting to
note that the European legislator has chosen not to apply the rules of the CRM
Directive to the mono-repertoire licensing entities.68 In the working documents
accompanying the Directive there is no evidence that would offer further insight
into the legislator’s reasoning. This might point towards the fact that the Eu-
ropean Commission has been satisfied with the developments in the space. As
seen above, the development of initiatives such as Armonia dates back to before
the entry into force of the Directive but after the Recommendation. Regarding
the codification of this specific licensing form, it appears that the legislator does
not adopt the legal innovations but rather takes action in order to define the
playing field for licensing – the autonomy space – given the lack of satisfactory
solutions provided by the actors.
Competition authorities have also been actively involved in stirring up the
licensing arrangements. This ultimately meant that the lead users (umbrella
organisations) and its community (CMOs) did not pursue their legal innovation
further (reciprocal representation agreements based on model contracts contain-
ing customer allocation clauses) culminating in the CISAC proceedings. The
intervention of DG COMP does not imply a failing of the user generated law,
but suggests rather that the model has been partly adopted and the respective
autonomy space corrected. Other initiatives to facilitate industry solutions rep-
resent a further grey-zone regarding the legislator’s engagement.69 All told, it
seems that the case of multi-territorial licenses is not easily put into the existing
categories and that more levels of adoption might arise from this complexity.
4 Concluding remarks
For over a decade, stakeholders have been busy adapting the traditional li-
censing arrangements for online music licensing from the territorial tradition of
copyright to the cross-border and multi-territorial reality of a knowledge soci-
ety. In the user generated law framework, ”law that accommodates the needs
of the knowledge society” is characterised by (1) flexible norms, (2) with cross-
68See discussion above under section 2.2.
69For example the Licenses for Europe stakeholder dialogue (2014).
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border scope and (3) which are industry- and subject-specific. It appears that
the developments in cross-border licensing of music rights are in many ways a
prototype of those characteristics. The licensing solutions are highly industry-
and subject-specific: namely addressing the situational need for interactive on-
demand streaming, thus permitting users to actively choose the musical works
and the time of consumption, and thereby reflecting the heterogeneity in de-
mand for legal solutions. The cross-border element has also been crucial in the
development of legal solutions, reflecting the global dimension of the content and
its distribution via the Internet. Finally, the question arises as to whether the
norms are flexible, reflecting the complexity and the fast pace of development.
One could argue that because of the highly specific subject matter related to
a technological and market phenomenon (i.e. streaming of music), these new
developments are not sufficiently covered to qualify as flexible. Understanding
flexibility within this subspace, it appears that the norms are sufficiently adap-
tive. In the case of music licensing, it is striking that in different facets the
European legislator has played an important role: an interplay that is challeng-
ing to construe within the user generated law framework.
The developments in the licensing landscape must be seen in the multi-
faceted context of enabling the Digital Single Market across all European Mem-
ber States; fostering innovation of new digital service providers in Europe; ad-
dressing competition concerns towards the collective management of rights; and
dealing with the legacy of the traditional territorial nature of copyright admin-
istration and exploitation. The regulatory framework and new ways of exploita-
tion affect the formation of private mechanisms of clearance of copyrights. Only
time will reveal whether the current licensing arrangements are fit for purpose
and able to facilitate future (and even already existing) services like Soundcloud,
where mashups and remixes are a major part of the content.
Music is often described as a harbinger for other forms of entertainment
goods, and the trend towards on-demand access can be seen in the number
of consumers now watching films and TV productions via services like Netflix,
or accessing books via commercial players like Oyster in the US or Mofibo in
Denmark or the Bokhylla (Norwegian for ”bookshelf”) project by the Norwegian
national library. These industry verticals face similar market challenges, but
may have gone through different developments (or indeed some common trends)
concerning their licensing models. By also applying the user generated law
model to those verticals, the paradigm will be tested further which may in turn
provide important policy implications.
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